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Bank Monitoring and Environmental Risk
Sebouh Aintablian, Patricia A. Mcgraw and Gordon S. Roberts*
Abstract: Loan announcement effects for 152 Canadian companies are examined to investigate
the efficiency of monitoring by banks facing lender environmental liability. Market reaction to
the announcement of bank debt to ‘environmental’ firms is more positive and significant than for
‘non-environmental’ firms and, for firms in industries with a higher likelihood of experiencing
spill events, is more positive and significant, reinforcing earlier results that establish a relationship
between specific loan/borrower characteristics and announcement period excess returns and
providing further evidence on the ‘uniqueness’ of bank loans by demonstrating the superior
ability of banks to monitor corporate borrowers exposed to environmental liability.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Loans to companies characterized by environmental risk provide a particularly inter-
esting example of bank monitoring. When banks announce the successful initiation of
such loans, the stock market receives new information on the borrower’s environmental
risk. Because prior research shows that disclosure of external environmental informa-
tion about lawsuits, spills and other measures of liability is a significant market event,
the study of announcements of loans to borrowers facing significant environmental
risk offers the potential for designing alternative tests of the importance of bank
monitoring.
Industry practice reinforces the view that bank monitoring is important in the case
of environmental risk. A survey of bank practices shows that, when applying for a
loan, firms facing environmental risk must go through stringent lender monitoring
before being approved (Thompson and Cowton, 2004). The international banking
industry recognized the importance of lender environmental risk in the United Nations
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Environmental Program’s ‘Statement by Banks on the Environment and Sustainable
Development’ (UNEP, 1992).
According to Thompson and Cowton (2004), from a lender’s perspective, environ-
mental risk has three dimensions. Direct risk of environmental liability occurs when a
lender takes possession of security in the form of contaminated property and becomes
liable for clean-up potentially beyond the value of the original loan.1 Indirect risk of
default (credit risk) arises when losses from environmental damage or increased costs
faced due to the introduction of more stringent environmental regulations causes
a borrower to default on a loan. Finally, a lender may suffer reputation risk from
association with an environmental disaster experienced by a borrower.
This paper addresses how bank monitoring controls environmental risk in loan
contracts either by self-selection on the part of borrowers (only ‘clean’ firms from
polluting industries apply for bank loans) or by bank monitoring or both. Employing
standard event study methodology, we find that announcements of loans to Canadian
firms in polluting industries are associated with abnormal positive returns that exceed
those arising in the case of loans to other industries. We interpret these results as
supportive of the view that the market regards bank monitoring as an effective screen
of environmental risk.
More broadly, this paper contributes to a growing body of evidence on lender
monitoring effectiveness. This is an important topic because it is at the heart of
why banks are ‘special’. Coleman et al. (2004) establish that borrowers pay more for
loans from banks with good monitoring ability while Lee and Sharpe (2004) find that
borrowers’ stock prices react more favorably to announcements of loans from such
banks. Both papers employ proxies for banks’ monitoring ability, conducting joint
tests of the validity of these measures along with the impact of monitoring quality on
loan pricing and announcement day returns. In the present study, we do not measure
monitoring effectiveness across a large sample of banks but rather focus directly on an
important subset of loans extended to environmentally risky borrowers. This alternative
test design allows us to validate the effectiveness of bank monitoring from a new
perspective.
We expand on the theoretical orientation and hypotheses in this paper in Section 2.
Section 3 presents our sample and test design. In Section 4, we present our empirical
results and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
When bank monitoring of a loan applicant from an industry with significant potential
exposure to environmental risk concludes with a favorable decision, the resulting loan
announcement in the news media represents an example of external disclosure of
positive environmental information.2 By making the loan, the bank signals that the
borrower has passed a number of tests for excessive environmental risk exposure. Banks
routinely perform initial assessments of borrowers’ risk of exposure to environmental
hazards. The techniques used by banks can involve requiring borrowers to have regular
third party audits and to establish trust funds to cover compliance costs.
1 McGraw and Roberts (2001) show that in this case security reduces the value of the loan.
2 Other ways in which environmental disclosure can occur are voluntary disclosure by the firm and
mandatory disclosure under regulation or accounting rules (Berthelot et al., 2003).
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Further, simply by applying for the loan, the borrower voluntarily subjects itself to
environmental screening by the bank, disclosing information about its environmental
risk exposure to the potential lender. Although this information does not become
public, by applying for a loan, the firm signals that it is not subject to high environmental
risk. Conversely, firms with hidden environmental liabilities may decide not to apply
for bank loans. In this sense, bank borrowing may be viewed as a form of voluntary
environmental disclosure similar to a voluntary discussion of environmental risk in a
firm’s annual report.
The present paper brings together research on bank monitoring effectiveness
and loan announcements with work on the market impact of new information on
environmental risk disclosed either by an external source or voluntarily by the company.
To set the stage for our contribution, we briefly review relevant prior research in each
of these areas.
(i) Bank Monitoring Effectiveness and Loan Announcements
A large body of theoretical research on the role of banks as delegated monitors
suggests they have a comparative advantage over other market participants in screening
and monitoring corporate clients. Theoretical models (Diamond, 1984 and 1991;
and Fama, 1985) conclude that bank lending signals borrower creditworthiness to
outside investors. Consistent with this view, an equally voluminous body of event studies
identifies positive effects on a borrowing firm’s stock in response to announcements of
bank loans.3 Although these results strongly imply that the average bank is an effective
monitor, monitoring ability is not directly observable and may vary across banks. To
address this complication, Lee and Sharpe (2004) draw on measures of monitoring
effectiveness developed for loan pricing tests by Coleman et al. (2004) and demonstrate
that the stock market reacts positively only to loan announcements involving banks with
superior monitoring abilities. Although the proxies for monitoring ability perform well
in their study, the Lee and Sharpe (2004) result remains a joint test of their hypothesis
and the accuracy of their proxies. As a result, it is useful to conduct alternative tests
of bank monitoring abilities. As discussed above, both regulators and bankers identify
environmental risk as highly important, making it a worthwhile vehicle for exploring
bank monitoring effectiveness.
(ii) External Environmental Disclosure
In their review article, Berthelot et al. (2003) document widespread evidence that
the stock market reacts to new information on corporate exposure to environmental
risk released by the news media and government regulators. Announcements of
US environmental lawsuits (Muolghalu et al., 1990) and lawsuit settlements for a
Canadian sample (Laplante and Lanoie, 1994) produce negative abnormal returns.
Similar negative stock market reaction is associated with announcements that the
Environmental Protection Agency is taking action against firms (Bosch et al., 1998)
as well as with publication of results of other regulatory pollution studies (Shane
and Spicer, 1983; and Konar and Cohen, 1997). Adoption of new environmental
3 James (1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989), Best and Zhang (1993), Billet et al. (1995) and Aintablian
and Roberts (2000), among others, have conducted event studies of bank loan announcements.
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legislation is associated with negative market reaction for chemical firms (Blacconiere
and Northcut, 1997). Further, several studies show that when public information is
available about significant environmental liabilities, firms’ financial performance over
a longer observation window suffers (Cormier and Magnan, 1997; and Campbell et al.,
1998). In summary, prior studies establish a range of external environmental disclosures
as significant market events. This reinforces our motivation for adding bank loan
announcements to that range.
(iii) Voluntary Environmental Disclosure
While the findings reviewed above consistently show that external disclosure of
environmental risk has a negative impact on financial performance, prior research does
not lead to a definitive conclusion for voluntary environmental disclosure. Berthelot
et al. (2003) review a large number of studies that address managers’ decisions to
engage in voluntary disclosure and the valuation impact of that disclosure. Larger,
widely-owned firms which are members of environmentally sensitive industries are more
likely to disclose environmental information voluntarily. Prior research also suggests
that firms are more likely to make voluntary disclosures if their environmental risk
is already in the media spotlight due to involvement in an environmental accident,
lawsuits, fines, attention from environmental lobby groups or a high political profile.
In brief, these studies suggest that it is possible to predict certain characteristics of
firms more likely to engage in voluntary environmental exposure. Consistent with the
view that such voluntary exposure can be subject to self-serving motivations, Berthelot
et al. (2003) conclude that it generally is not associated with any significant impact on
corporate financial performance.
(iv) Hypotheses
This study examines the loan announcement effect for a sample of Toronto Stock
Exchange companies. We first examine the market reaction to all loan announcements
to determine if investors regard the average bank as an effective monitor. Next, in
the main contribution in this paper, we compare the market response for a set of
‘environmental’ firms against the response for ‘non-environmental’ ones and, finally,
evaluate the impacts for different industries within the ‘environmental’ firms. We
view such announcements involving ‘environmental’ firms as external disclosures of
environmental information in addition to loan announcements. Based on our review of
prior research on external environmental disclosures, we predict that positive market
reaction should be accentuated when banks extend financing to firms in ‘polluting’
industries. Further, the current study empirically tests whether, for firms with exposure
to environmental hazards, the announcement of bank debt is ‘extra good news’.
The main hypotheses to be tested are:
H1: Ceteris paribus, the market reaction to the announcement of bank loans to
‘environmental’ firms should be more positive than for ‘non-environmental’
firms.
H2: Ceteris paribus, within the class of ‘environmental’ firms, the market reaction
to the announcement of bank loans to firms in industries with a higher
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likelihood of experiencing spill events should be more positive than for
those with less likelihood.
We base our hypotheses on our classification of loan announcements to ‘environmen-
tal’ firms as external disclosure of environmental information. However, as discussed
above, such announcements also represent voluntary disclosure on the part of the
borrowing firm.4 In effect, any announcement effect that we observe represents a
weighted combination (with unobservable weights) of the impacts of external and
voluntary disclosures. As a result, we must consider two ways in which our hypotheses
might change for voluntary disclosures. First, our literature review above concludes
that, unlike external exposure, voluntary exposure generally does not have a significant
impact on stockholder returns. As a result, any evidence supportive of H1 and H2
must be interpreted as upholding a joint test of these hypotheses along with the
classification of our sample of loan announcements as primarily external disclosures
of environmental information. Conversely, support for the null hypotheses could arise
either due to failure of the market to respond to external disclosures in the form of
loan announcements or to its viewing loan announcements not as external but rather
as voluntary disclosures.
Second, as discussed earlier, prior research finds that voluntary disclosure is more
likely for large, widely-held firms that are already publicly identified as subject to
significant environmental risk. To the extent that these predictors of the probability
of voluntary disclosure are associated with risk factors not priced in the market model
used in our tests, any positive abnormal returns we observe could be an artifact of
these missing factors thus creating a bias in favor of accepting our hypotheses. Given
that prior research found no statistically significant association between returns and
voluntary disclosure, we believe this bias is acceptably small.
3. SAMPLE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY
Our sample consists of 152 bank loan announcements for Canadian firms for the period
1988-1997. We obtain the loan announcements by searching Canadian Corporate
News, Canada Newswire and the Financial Post database. Only firms that are traded
on the Toronto Stock Exchange are included. There are 86 loan announcements
to ‘environmental’ firms and 66 for ‘non-environmental’ firms. A firm is classified
as ‘environmental’ if it belongs to any of the seven industries (excluding the
government) that are mentioned in the Summary of Spill Events in Canada: 1984-97
published by Environment Canada. These industries represent 63% of the total spills
reported and 93% of the total quantity reported spilled. The seven industries are:
Petroleum, Government, Chemical, Metallurgy, Service, Pulp and Paper, and Mining.
Our classification of industries adjusts that of Environment Canada to conform to the
Toronto Stock Exchange’s categorization of industries. The five industries that are
considered ‘environmental’ in our sample are: oil and gas, metals and minerals, paper
and forest products, gold and precious minerals, and industrial products. The last is
a broader category which includes chemicals and the service industry together with
other sub-categories.5
4 We are indebted to the anonymous referee for raising this point.
5 Further classification of the firms according to their SIC codes could improve the matching between
Environment Canada and Toronto Stock Exchange classifications.
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Daily stock returns and market index returns are obtained from the Canadian
Financial Markets Research Center (CFMRC) database that includes daily opening
and closing data for prices, bids, asks, trades, and volumes for companies listed on the
Toronto Stock Exchange. The daily returns in the CFMRC database are calculated as if
the security were purchased at the close of day t − 1 and sold at the close of day t. The
CFMRC value-weighted index is the market-value weighted, average daily return for all
domestic equities in the database.
The market model is used to calculate excess returns. The two-day event window
[0,1] is defined as the day of the announcement (t = 0) and the following day (t = 1).
This procedure incorporates the possibility that some of the announcements are made
after trading hours. The market model is estimated on daily returns for the period
beginning 180 trading days before the event date and ending 31 trading days before
the event date.
The excess stock return, or prediction error, for firm j over day t is defined as:
PE j t = Rjt − (αˆ j + βˆ j Rmt )
where:
Rjt is the rate of return of security j over period t
Rmt is the rate of return on a value-weighted market index over period t
αˆ j and βˆ j are the ordinary least squares estimates of firm j’s market model
parameters.
Announcement period excess returns are calculated by summing the prediction
errors for days 0 and 1 and then averaging over all firms within a particular group.
Since tests of statistical significance are based on standardized prediction errors, we
standardize the prediction errors for the two days by dividing by the standard error of
the forecast:6
SPE j =
1∑
t=0
PE j t
s j
S j =

2v
2
j

1 +
1
M
+ (Rmt − Rm)
2
M∑
t=1
(Rmt − Rm)2




1
2
where:
Sj is the standard error of the forecast for security j in the event period
v2j is the residual variance of the market model regression for firm j
M is the number of days in the estimation period (M = 150)
Rmt is the market return in the event period
Rm is the mean market return over the estimation period.
6 The error terms are standardized using the method first introduced into finance by Jaffe (1974) and
Mandelker (1974). MacKinlay (1997) provides a review of event study methodology. We assume that Rm 0 =
Rm 1 in calculating the standard error of the forecast.
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The average standardized prediction error is:
SPEt = 1N
N∑
j=1
SPE j t .
Finally, assuming that the individual prediction errors are cross-sectionally indepen-
dent, the following t-statistic is calculated:
t =
√
N(SPEt ).
Under the null hypothesis of no announcement effect, the standardized prediction
errors (SPES) are distributed asymptotically N (0, 1) and the mean standardized
prediction error is distributed N(0, 1/
√
N):
H0 : SPEt = 0.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 1 reports full sample results of the average stock price response to loan
announcements. The average excess return for all bank loans is 1.31%, a result
statistically significant at the 0.01 confidence level for the sample of 152 cases. This
suggests that the stock market regards the average bank as an effective monitor. The
average excess returns for ‘environmental’ firms and non-environmental firms are
1.49% and 1.02%, respectively, and both are significant. The difference between these
two mean excess returns is also significant at the 0.05 level employing a t-test for
differences of sample means assuming equal variances. These results are consistent with
our first hypothesis (H1) that the market reaction to the announcement of bank debt
to ‘environmental’ firms is predicted to be more positive than for ‘non-environmental’
firms. The presence of environmental risk implies that banks are expected to monitor
‘environmental’ firms in a more intense manner. Our results in Table 1 are consistent
with the hypothesis that the positive announcement effect increases with increased
monitoring.
Table 1 also shows that the results for the five industries within the ‘environmental’
group are all positive and significant. The average excess returns for the oil and
gas, metals and minerals, industrial products, paper and forest products, and gold
and precious minerals are 1.76%, 1.54%, 1.48%, 1.36% and 1.24% respectively.7
The Summary of Spill Events in Canada: 1984-95 published by Environment Canada
reports that the total number of spills was highest for the petroleum industry (26976
spills) followed by the metallurgy (4381), service (3863), pulp and paper (2715),
and mining (1971) industries. The differences of the mean excess returns between
different categories are significant at the 0.05 and 0.10 levels employing a t-test
for differences of sample means assuming equal variances. Our results for the loan
announcement effects are consistent with our second hypothesis that the market
7 These average excess returns are significant at the 0.01 level for the oil and gas firms, the 0.05 level for the
metal and minerals, industrial products, and gold and precious minerals firms, and at the 0.10 level for the
paper and forest products firms.
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Table 1
Average Announcement Period Excess Returns and Significance Tests for a
Sample of 152 Bank Loans for TSX-listed Companies 1988-1997
Average
Type of Announcement Sample Excess Return t-statistic
I. All loan announcements 152 1.31% 5.68∗∗∗
Environmental groups 86 1.49% 4.21∗∗∗1
Non-environmental groups 66 1.02% 2.04∗∗
II. Environmental groups
All industries 86 1.49% 4.21∗∗∗
Oil & gas 18 1.76% 2.23∗∗2
Metals & minerals 21 1.54% 2.29∗∗3
Industrial products 18 1.48% 2.16∗∗4
Paper & forest products 14 1.36% 1.86∗
Gold & precious minerals 15 1.24% 1.98∗∗
Notes:
∗∗∗Significant at the 0.01 level; ∗∗significant at the 0.05 level; ∗significant at the 0.10 level.
1The difference of the mean excess returns between ‘environmental’ and ‘non-environmental’ firms is
significant at the 0.05 level.
2The difference of the mean excess returns between ‘oil and gas’ and ‘metals and minerals’ firms is
significant at the 0.05 level.
3The difference of the mean excess returns between ‘metals and minerals’ and ‘industrial’ firms is significant
at the 0.05 level.
4The difference of the mean excess returns between ‘industrial’ and ‘paper and forest products’ firms is
significant at the 0.10 level.
reaction to the announcement of bank debt to firms in industries with a higher
likelihood of experiencing spill events should be more positive.
(i) Regression Analysis
A regression analysis has the potential to validate the other tests already discussed.
Pooling all of our observations, we estimate a regression for the 152 bank loans with the
two-day announcement period, standardized excess return as the dependent variable.
We estimate the following regression equation in order to examine whether (i) being
an ‘environmental’ firm or (ii) belonging to an industry with a higher likelihood of
spills influences the equity market’s reaction to loan announcements:
PEi = B0 + B1ENVIRONDUM + B2SPILLDUM + εi
where:
PEi is the two-day abnormal return for firm i
ENVIRONDUM is a dummy variable equal to 1 for ‘environmental’ firms and 0 for
non-environmental ones
SPILLDUM is a dummy variable equal to 1 for ‘environmental’ firms that
belong to industries with a higher number of spill events (oil and gas,
metals and minerals, and industrial products) and 0 for the
remaining industries (pulp and paper, gold and precious metals)
and for non-environmental firms.
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ε i is the error term.
To correct for heteroskedasticity of cross-sectional stock returns (Lummer and
McConnell, 1989; and Slovin et al., 1992; both sides of the equation are divided by
the standard error of the forecast Si derived from the market model estimation. The
revised regression equation becomes:
SPEi = B0/Si + B1ENVIRONDUM/Si + B2SPILLDUM/Si + εi/Si
where SPEi is the standardized two-day announcement return for firm i.
The regression results are:
SPEi = 0.66/Si + 0.39
(t=2.56)
ENVIRONDUM/Si + 0.23
(t=1.98)
SPILLDUM/Si + εi/Si
R2 = 0.22 N = 152.
Consistent with the results reported in Table 1, the coefficients for the ‘environmen-
tal’ dummy and spill events dummy are positive and significant at the 0.01 and 0.05
confidence levels, respectively. These results also support the two main hypotheses that
the announcement of bank debt to ‘environmental’ firms in general, and to industries
with a higher number of spill events in particular, is considered ‘extra good’ news by
the market.
Our results on loan announcements to firms in polluting industries suggest that
bank monitoring creates an effective screen for environmental risk in the view of equity
markets. Linking to prior research which finds significant market reaction associated
with external but not voluntary disclosure of environmental information, our results
support our classification of loan announcements in the external category. Put another
way, our findings are consistent with the view that markets regard banks as effective
monitors of environmental risk.
As explained above, loan announcements also involve voluntary disclosure of
environmental information as firms facing high environmental risks, recognizing
that their chances of acceptance are slim, may voluntarily decide to seek alternative
sources of funding from public debt markets, private debt placements or equity. As
a result, only firms with low environmental risk request loans from banks making
the act of applying for a loan into a voluntary environmental risk disclosure. Given
the weight of prior research behind the argument that only external disclosure
is associated with significant market reactions, the significant excess returns we
document make discovering the extent to which environmental loan announcements
incorporate voluntary disclosure somewhat of a moot point. Distinguishing between
these alternative forms of implementation is left for future research on richer data
sets. Such research could examine decisions to use private bank debt vs. other forms
of financing, adding variables to capture the environmental exposure of borrowers.8
Further, with the cooperation of a major bank, it would be possible to examine the
environmental exposure characteristics of loan applicants separated into successful and
unsuccessful applications. Comparing unsuccessful applicants against firms employing
alternative forms of financing could reveal the extent to which loan applicants self-select
conditional on environmental risk.
8 Denis and Mihov (2003) is a precedent here.
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(ii) Robustness of the Results
In this section, we examine whether our results may have alternative interpretations.
One possibility is that our variables in the previous regression (ENVIRONDUM,
SPILLDUM) may be serving as proxies for other factors determining the market’s
reaction. For this reason, we specify additional variables reflecting characteristics of
the bank loan. These variables were used in Aintablian and Roberts (2000, p. 391,
Table 3).
For the new regression, the independent variables are:
X 1: a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is ‘environmental’
X 2: a dummy variable indicating whether the firm belongs to industries with a
higher number of spill events (oil and gas, metals and minerals, and industrial
products)
X 3, X 4 and X 5: three dummy variables indicating whether: (i) the loan is with the
same bank, (ii) the loan is a favorable renewal and (iii) the loan is a restructuring.
X 6, X 7: two dummy variables indicating whether: (i) the loan is syndicated,
and (ii)whether the loan has medium to long term maturity.
The regression equation is:
SPEi = D0si +
i=7∑
i=1
Di Xi
si
+ εi
si
where:
SPEi is the two day standardized excess return for stock i
D0 is the intercept
D1 . . . D7 are the coefficients of the dummy variables
X1 . . . X7 are the independent variables
Si is the standard error of the excess returns for stock i.
The regression results are in Table 2. Note that, for this regression, we have used
only a sample of 122 observations, excluding 30 observations that lack information
regarding variables X 3 to X 7. The results show that the first two variables (the
‘environmental’ dummy and the ‘spill events’ dummy) are both positive and significant
at the 0.05 and 0.10 confidence levels respectively. The remaining variables X 3 . . . X 7
which were initially tested in Aintablian and Roberts (2000) have maintained their
predicted sign and statistical significance. It is clear that the first two variables continue
to have a significant impact when alternative factors ‘causing’ the market reaction are
examined. This shows that the ‘environmental’ variable and the ‘spill events’ variable
do not convey ‘redundant’ information. Hence, we conclude that these variables do
not serve as a proxy for other borrower or loan characteristics.9
In our second robustness test, we examine whether an alternative interpretation
of the extra positive announcement effect for loans to environmental firms could
be that the market is certifying that the borrower’s legal structure would allow it to
shift the blame for any spill to a subsidiary at sufficient arm’s length to cancel out
9 Unique loan contract terms such as covenants and pricing, and the characteristics of individual firms such
as existing bank debt, credit rating, and prior spill costs may influence the announcement effects.
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Table 2
Results of Regression of Standardized Excess Returns on Various Standardized
Dummy Variables for a Sample of 122 Bank Loans for TSX-listed Companies
Variable Coefficient t-statistic
X 1 0.27 2.03∗∗
(1 if ‘environmental’ firm, 0 otherwise)
X 2 0.13 1.77∗
(1 if ‘high spill’ industry, 0 otherwise)
X 3 0.29 2.11∗∗
(1 if same bank, 0 otherwise)
X 4 0.31 2.76∗∗∗
(1 if renewal loan, 0 otherwise)
X 5 0.47 3.01∗∗∗
(1 if restructuring loan, 0 otherwise)
X 6 −0.24 −1.98∗∗
(1 if syndicated loan, 0 otherwise)
X 7 −0.29 −1.74∗
(1 if medium-term and long-term maturity, 0 otherwise)
Intercept 0.05
R -square 0.29
Notes:
∗∗∗Significant at the 0.01 level; ∗∗significant at the 0.05 level; ∗significant at the 0.10 level.
any bankruptcy risk to the borrower (parent company). This would also cancel any
risk to the lender. However, Blacconiere and Patten (1994) find that chemical firms
were widely perceived to be exposed after the Bhopal accident. Further, Blaccconiere
and Northcut (1997) find that the introduction of environmental legislation had a
negative impact on chemical firms generally. These studies suggest that environmental
risk characterizes entire industries and is not escapable.
To reinforce this argument, we conduct a test of the structures of our environmental
firms to ensure that they are not unusually complex and therefore able to shift potential
liability. Table 3 shows the results of tests on three measures of complexity: the number
Table 3
Statistical Tests of the Structures of Environmental Firms
Mean of Mean of
No. Numbers of Numbers of Mean of
of Lines of Geographic Numbers of
Obs Business3 Regions3 Subsidiaries3
Non-environmental Firms 36 3.7222 2.1667 7.9167
Environmental Firms 54 3.1296 2.0185 5.7407
Dif Mean (Nonenv − Env) 0.5926 0.1482 2.176
t-test for Mean Difference1 1.36 0.26 0.75
Wilcoxon Test for Mean Difference2 1854.5∗∗ 1600.00 1653.50
1t-statistics are one-sided tests assuming unequal variances: H0 = Dif Mean (Nonenv − Env) = 0.
2Wilcoxon Statistics are one-sided tests assuming t-approximation: H0 = Dif Mean (Nonenv − Env) = 0.
3∗Significant at the 0.1 level; ∗∗significant at the 0.05 level; ∗∗∗significant at the 0.01 level.
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of lines of business that the firm is in, the number of geographic regions in which the
firm operates and the number of subsidiaries. These data are from the Financial Post
Data Group and are observed for the year of the loan announcement. Table 3 shows
that, contrary to the blame shifting argument, it is the non-environmental firm that is
significantly more complex as measured by the number of business lines. There is no
significant difference between the two groups by the other two measures.
5. CONCLUSION
We employ standard event study methodology to examine stock market reaction
to announcements of bank loans extended to Canadian firms in industries subject
to substantial environmental risk. In contrast with loan announcements to ‘non-
environmental’ firms in other industries, our sample displays larger positive announce-
ment effects which increase for firms in the industries with the highest environmental
exposure according to a spill index maintained by regulators. Consistent with prior
research on external, third-party release of firm environmental information in the
form of media coverage of lawsuits, environmental spills and changes in regulations,
our results suggest that when such information takes the form of loan announcements
it is regarded as validation of lower risk status for the borrower.
Our conclusions are founded on the argument that, when environmental risk is
present, announcement of a bank loan comes at the end of a detailed investigation by
the lender which corroborates the absence of undue levels of environmental exposure.
It is possible, however, that, realizing that banks conduct detailed environmental audits,
potential borrowers self select with only ‘clean’ firms applying for bank loans and
‘dirty’ firms pursuing other funding sources. In this case, the act of applying for a bank
loan represents a form of voluntary disclosure on the part of the firm. Distinguishing
between the external and voluntary disclosure aspects of bank loan announcements
could be a fruitful topic for future research.
By establishing bank loan announcements as significant conveyors of information
about borrower environmental risks, our study adds to the evidence that banks are
efficient monitors – a finding important to the theoretical literature on why banks
are special. Because it does not depend on the efficacy of proxy measures for bank
monitoring efficiency, our confirmation provides a useful complement to the findings
of Coleman et al. (2004) and Lee and Sharpe (2004).
REFERENCES
Aintablian, S. and G.S. Roberts (2000), ‘A Note on Market Response to Corporate Loan
Announcements in Canada’, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 24, pp. 381–93.
Berthelot, S., D. Cormier and M. Magnan (2003), ‘Environmental Disclosure Research: Review
and Synthesis’, Journal of Accounting Literature, Vol. 22, pp. 1–44.
Best, R. and H. Zhang (1993), ‘Alternative Information Sources and the Information Content
of Bank Loans’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, No. 4, pp. 1507–22.
Billet, M.T., M.J. Flannery and J.A. Garfinkel (1995), ‘The Effect of Lender Identity on a
Borrowing Firm’s Equity Return’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 699–718.
Blacconiere, W.G. and W.D. Northcut (1997), ‘Environmental Information and Market
Reactions to Environmental Legislation’, Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance,
Vol. 12, pp. 149–78.
——— and D.M. Patten (1994), ‘Environmental Disclosures, Regulatory Costs, and Changes
in Firm Value’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 18, pp. 357–77.
C© 2006 The Authors
Journal Compilation C© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006
BANK MONITORING AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISK 401
Bosch, J.C., E.W. Eckhard and I. Lee (1998), ‘EPA Enforcement, Firm Response Strategies and
Stockholder Wealth: An Empirical Examination’, Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol.
19, pp. 167–77.
Campbell, K., S.E. Sefcik and N.S. Soderstrom (1998), ‘Site Uncertainty, Allocation Uncer-
tainty, and Superfund Liability Valuation’, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 17,
pp. 331–66.
Coleman, A., N. Esho and I. Sharpe (2004), ‘Does Bank Monitoring Influence Loan
Contract Terms?’ (December) Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Working Paper
No. 2002-02 (http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=633901).
Cormier, D. and M. Magnan (1997), ‘Investors’ Assessment of Implicit Environmental
Liabilities: An Empirical Investigation’, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 16,
pp. 215–41.
Denis, D.J. and V. Mihov (2003), ‘The Choice Among Bank Debt, Non-bank Private Debt, and
Public Debt: Evidence from New Corporate Borrowings’, Journal of Financial Economics,
Vol. 70, pp. 3–28.
Diamond, D.W. (1984), ‘Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring’, Review of
Economic Studies, Vol. 51, pp. 393–414.
——— (1991), ‘Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice Between Bank Loans and Directly
Placed Debt’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 99, pp. 689–721.
Environment Canada, Summary of Spill Events in Canada: 1984-1995.
Fama, E.F. (1985), ‘What’s Different About Banks?’, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 15,
pp. 29–39.
Jaffe, J. (1974), ‘The Effect of Regulation Changes on Insider Trading’, Bell Journal of Economics
and Management Science, Vol. 5, pp. 93–121.
James, C. (1987), ‘Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans’, Journal of Financial
Economics, Vol. 19, pp. 217–35.
Konar, S. and M.A. Cohen (1997), ‘Information as Regulation: The Effect of Community Right
to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Vol. 36, pp. 243–66.
Laplante, B. and P. Lanoie (1994), ‘The Market Response to Environmental Regulation in
Canada: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis’, Southern Economic Journal , Vol. 6, pp. 657–
72.
Lee, K.W. and I.G. Sharpe (2004), ‘Does the Bank’s Monitoring Ability Matter?’, Working
Paper (University of New South Wales).
Lummer, S.L. and J.J. McConnell (1989), ‘Further Evidence on the Bank Lending Process and
the Capital Market Response to Bank Loan Agreements’, Journal of Financial Economics,
Vol. 25, pp. 99–122.
MacKinlay, A.C. (1997), ‘Event Studies in Economics and Finance’, Journal of Economic
Literature, Vol. 35, pp. 13–39.
Mandelker, G. (1974), ‘Risk and Return: The Case of Merging Firms’, Journal of Financial
Economics, Vol. V1, No. 4, pp. 303–35.
McGraw, P.A. and G.S. Roberts, (2001), ‘Secured Debt and Lender Environmental Liability’,
Research in Finance, Vol. 18, pp. 83–104.
Muoghalu, M.I., H.D. Robison and J.L. Glascock (1990), ‘Hazardous Waste Lawsuits, Stock-
holder Returns, and Deterrence’, Southern Economic Journal , Vol. 57, pp. 357–70.
Shane, P.B. and B.H. Spicer (1983), ‘Market Response to Environmental Information
Produced Outside the Firm’, Accounting Review, Vol. 58, pp. 521–38.
Slovin, M.B., S.A. Johnson and J.L. Glascock (1992), ‘Firm Size and the Information Content
of Bank Loan Announcements’, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 16, pp. 1057–71.
Thompson, P. and C.J. Cowton (2004), ‘Bringing the Environment into Bank Lending:
Implications for Environmental Lending’, British Accounting Review, Vol. 36, pp. 197–218.
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) (1992), Statement by Banks on the Environment
and Sustainable Development.
C© 2006 The Authors
Journal Compilation C© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006
